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PRESCHOOL CHILDREN REASON ABOUT Zd/^d^ ?MENTAL 
STATES WHEN NAMING DRAWINGS
Nera Bozin1, Nicole Yuen2, Ljubica Marjanovic Umek3, Erika Nurmsoo1
This research investigated how 3- to 5-year-old children
understand drawings based on mental states, namely
knowledge and belief. Results showed that most 3-year-olds
understood an ĂƌƚŝƐƚ ?Ɛ knowledge state. Children aged
between four and five years showed understanding of false
belief. The drawing did not facilitate ĐŚŝůĚƌĞŶ ?Ɛunderstanding
of the ĂƌƚŝƐƚ ?Ɛ mental state, as children were equally
successful when naming a drawing or answering a question
about the artist's mental state. These results imply that
children are able to understand different mental states
simultaneously.
ABSTRACT
Theory of mind encompasses many mental states  ?we focused on knowledge state
and belief. While understanding knowledge means retaining specific information,
belief represents having a subjective experience about that situation or a
behaviour. Children develop knowledge state understanding between 3 and 5 years
of age (e.g. Doherty, 2005) and false belief between 4 and 5 years of age (Deneault,
2015; Doherty, 2009; Wimmer & Perner, 1983) independent of the used task
(location change task or unexpected contents task).
However, there are only few researchers (e.g. Zaitchik, 1990) that used a picture or
a drawing to evaluate mental state understanding in children. Considering that a
ƉĞƌƐŽŶ ?Ɛintent is leading the drawing making process, naming a drawing shows
recognition of whether children understand what the artist intended to draw. That
could reflect their understanding of the ĂƌƚŝƐƚ ?Ɛmental state, which might be more
easily expressed with an everyday drawing compared to answering a question.
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
CHILDREN 44 GIRLS 47.70%
BOYS 52.30%
Average age 4 years, 7 months
Age range 3;0 to 5;11
Testing location
Kent Child Development unit 55.60%
Blean Primary School 44.40%
METHOD
Í There were two cars  ? one figurine saw one car
(ignorant), and the other figurine saw both cars
(knowledgeable).
ÍOne figurine drew a car and children were asked,
 ?ǁŚŝĐŚcar did s/he ĚƌĂǁ ?.
Í Answering the question about which car has the
figurine seen showed understanding of the
knowledge state.
CARS TASK
Children followed three very short stories  ?figurines produced some drawings in two of
them (see Cars task and Smarties task). We asked children what happened in the story
and specifically what the figurines drew.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
ÍOne figurine saw that pennies were inside
the Smarties box while the other did not.
Í Both figurines drew circles, and children
were asked what the drawings depicted.
Í Children were asked about the beliefs of
each figurine  ? ?ǁŚĂƚdoes Ben think is inside
the ďŽǆ ? ? ?.
Í This task measured ĐŚŝůĚƌĞŶ ?Ɛunderstanding
of belief.
Î Standard false belief task  ? ?ǁŚĂƚ
will mum think is inside the
ďŽǆ ? ? ?.
Î This task measured reasoning
about false belief.
SMARTIES TASK
KNOWLEDGE STATE UNDERSTANDING Î 75% of 3-year-olds
understood the ĨŝŐƵƌŝŶĞ ?Ɛknowledge state when being asked orally.
FALSE AND TRUE BELIEF UNDERSTANDING Î There was a
difference between ĐŚŝůĚƌĞŶ ?Ɛperformance on true and false belief questions.
81% of children answered true belief questions correctly, while only 50% of
children answered false belief questions correctly. These were mostly (63%) 5-
year-olds.
NAMING AMBIGUOUS DRAWINGÎ The ambiguous drawing did not
facilitate ĐŚŝůĚƌĞŶ ?Ɛunderstanding of the ĂƌƚŝƐƚ ?Ɛmental state, as children were
equally successful when naming a drawing or answering a question about the
artist's mental state. These results imply that children are able to understand
different mental states simultaneously.
MENTAL STATES, MENTAL REPRESENTATIONS AND 
REPRESENTATIONS
Regarding the fact that some children had difficulties with naming the drawings
(bubbles, peas  ?) and that false belief understanding showed to be understood
later than other mental states, we account that to the ability to understand
mental representations. As false belief understanding demands representation
of something that is not a reflection of reality, it requires mental
representation. Similarly, ambiguous drawings require the ability to
metarepresent, which seems to be more difficult for children than to
understand others mental states.
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CRAYONS BOX TASK
The children had greater difficulties with understanding
mental representations than understanding mental states
of others, which corresponds with theory of mind as a
domain-general capacity (Leekam etc., 2008). Children
develop the understanding of mental representations later,
along with understanding of ambiguous drawings and false
belief.
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